RansomwareTargets Brazil

cactus

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

The CACTUS ransomware is said to have emerged around March 2023. The group became known for exploiting vulnerabilities to gain initial access and maintain a presence within the organization's infrastructure.<br> <br> There is little known information about the ransomware group, except that it emerged on the mentioned date and, following encryption, a text file named 'cAcTuS.readme.txt' would be created. Additionally, encrypted files were altered to the '.cts1' extension, and data exfiltration and victim extortion were conducted through the use of the service known as Tox.<br>Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Cobalt Strike
Discovery
NmapSoftPerfect NetScan
Remote access (RMM)
AnyDeskSplashtopSuperOps
Tunneling and networking
Chisel
Exfiltration
RClone

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: The group exploits vulnerabilities in VPN applications.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task: The group uses task scheduling for file execution for C2 communication and uses ransomware payload persistence.
    • T1072 Software Deployment Tools: Actors attempt to gain access and use a set of third-party software installed on the network for lateral movement.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1136 Create Account: The group creates a service/system account to launch the ransomware.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information: The group uses file obfuscation techniques to avoid detection by defenses.
    • T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing: Actors use packing in ransomware payload to avoid detection by defenses.
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: The group performs LSASS memory dump to identify credentials.
    • T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers: The group searches for key files from users' browsers to locate stored passwords to proceed with the attack and access other accounts.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: Actors attempt to obtain a list of other systems, hosts, IPs, and any other identifier for lateral movement.
    • T1049 System Network Connections Discovery: Actors use tools to scan the organization's infrastructure systems.
    • T1087 Account Discovery: Actors attempt to obtain a list of accounts, user names, and valid email addresses for later access.
    • T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: Actors use scripts to identify domain accounts of connected users through Windows event logs.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol: Cactus actors use valid accounts to log into devices via RDP.
    • T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH: The group uses initial access to set up an SSH tunnel to C2.
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: Actors use tools or other files between systems to prepare files and encrypt data.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Actors exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service through tools such as Rclone and others.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1090 Proxy: Actors use connection proxy to route network traffic between systems to avoid detection by security solutions.
    • T1219 Remote Access Software: Actors use RDP connection to access other devices on the internal network.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Actors use ransomware payload to encrypt data and change extensions.
  • Resource Development TA0042
    • T1583.008 Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising: The threat actor was identified by Microsoft as responsible for the Danabot campaign via malvertising for final delivery of Ransomware Cactus.
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: The group uses modification and disabling of security tools to avoid possible malware and access detection.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 03 Jul 2023 to 17 Mar 2025

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

2 known site(s): 0 online, 2 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 6

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

cAcTuS.readme.txt · 3 contact(s) masked
Your systems were accessed and encrypted by Cactus.
Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines.
Otherwise the data may be corrupted and unrecoverable.
The best you can do is wait until encryption is finished to keep your files safe.
Besides, we have downloaded a huge pack of confidential information from your systems.
To recover your files and prevent disclosure of your sensitive data contact us via email: [email]
Your unique ID: 
Backup contacts: EMAIL: [email]
TOX ([link]
[Tox ID]
cAcTuS.readme_2.txt · 3 contact(s) masked
Your systems were accessed and encrypted by Cactus.
Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines.
Otherwise the data may be corrupted and unrecoverable.
The best you can do is wait until encryption is finished to keep your files safe.
Besides, we have downloaded a huge pack of confidential information from your systems.
To recover your files and prevent disclosure of your sensitive data contact us via email: [email]
Your unique ID: 
Backup contacts: EMAIL: [email]
TOX ([link]
[Tox ID]
cAcTuS.readme_3.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
Your systems were accessed and encrypted by Cactus.
To recover your files and prevent data disclosure contact us via email: [email]
Your unique ID reference: 
Backup contact: TOX ([link]
[Tox ID]
cAcTuS.readme_4.txt · 3 contact(s) masked
Your systems were accessed and encrypted by Cactus.
Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines.
Otherwise the data may be corrupted and unrecoverable.
The best you can do is wait until encryption is finished to keep your files safe.
Besides, we have downloaded a huge pack of confidential information from your systems.
To recover your files and prevent disclosure of your sensitive data contact us via email: [email] 
Your unique ID: 
Backup contacts: [.onion address] 
TOX ([link] [Tox ID]
cAcTuS.readme_5.txt · 4 contact(s) masked
Your systems were accessed and encrypted by Cactus.
Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines.
Otherwise the data may be corrupted and unrecoverable.
The best you can do is wait until encryption is finished to keep your files safe
.
Besides, we have downloaded a huge pack of confidential information from your sy
stems.
Your data will be sold or published in our blog https:\[.onion address] in case of non-payment
To recover your files and prevent disclosure of your sensitive data contact us via email: [email]
Your unique ID: [snip]
Backup contacts: [.onion address]
TOX ([link]
[Tox ID]
cAcTuS.readme_6.txt · 3 contact(s) masked
Your corporate network was compromised and encrypted by Cactus.
Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines until the encryption is complete. Otherwise the data may be corrupted.
In addition to the encrypted infrastructure, we have downloaded a lot of confidential information from your systems. The publication of these documents may cause the termination of your commercial activities, contracts with your clients and partners, and multiple lawsuits.
If you ignore this warning and do not contact us, your sensitive data will be posted on our blog: [.onion address]
In your best interest is to avoid contacting law enforcement and data recovery companies. They can't help you with the recovery, will cause more problems and expenses, and delay the return to normal work significantly.
Besides, if you contact the police we will immediately publish your data.
A quick recovery is very important to keep your business running at full capacity and minimize losses. This is why you need to begin negotiations as soon as possible. By the way, if you don't contact us within 5 days, we will start publishing your data.
Download TOR Browser ([link] and follow the link:
[link] address]
Your username: [snip]
Your password: [snip]
Reply to the welcome email and we will get your message.

Backup contact is TOX ([link]
[Tox ID]
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 55

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

Indicators (IOCs)
MD5 50
  • 0a75d6369662af48ce6789d6b313a9a5
  • 0c0ece5515f5e2719f0e0a93e1f112dc
  • 0e4ee38fe320cfb573a30820198ff442
  • 11af5c1051f89e0933646121eefb388b
  • 13ace884f11b68fd1d427f3f4effaf76
  • 13baaae3f238bff3b5d3294f66a63bc0
  • 155a1d61ba47a8fbb87ba1aced22649e
  • 1773e21117bd6a0e17a3975be84ab6ae

and 42 more: see them all in the IOC search

4 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

cactus.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • cactus · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

Impact and victims

The group cactus has 6 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

6known victims
1in Brazil
3sectors hit
Most attacked sectors
Technology3
Agriculture and Food Production2
Financial Services1
Most affected countries
🇲🇽 Mexico3
🇧🇷 Brazil1
🇨🇱 Chile1
🇺🇾 Uruguay1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planTechnology · MX · 2024-07-06
Name on the SOC planTechnology · MX · 2024-04-09
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · CL · 2024-04-04
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · MX · 2023-12-05
Name on the SOC planTechnology · UY · 2023-11-06
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · BR · 2023-09-05

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

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