RansomwareTargets Brazil

maze

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Maze ransomware group is one of the most known ransomware gangs, they targeted organizations worldwide across many industries. Security researchers believed that Maze operates as an affiliated network model. MAZE was one of the first groups that made a 'Double Extortion Attack' involved Allied Universal, in November 2019, the group leaks their victim's data in the darknet. On November 1, 2020, MAZE announced an official press release that they are closing their operation. is malware targeting organizations worldwide across many industries. Security researchers claim that the threat actor behind the MAZE group is 'TA2101'.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Cobalt StrikeMetasploitMeterpreterPowerSploit
Credential theft
MimikatzProcDump
Discovery
AdFindAdvanced IP ScannerBloodhoundPingCastlePowerViewShareFinder
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
PsExecWMIC
Exfiltration
WinSCP

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1189 Drive-by Compromise: Maze distributed via exploit kits (Fallout EK, Spelevo EK) through malvertising campaigns and compromised websites.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN and Citrix ADC (CVE-2019-19781) vulnerabilities to gain initial access.
    • T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment: Maze used malicious Word documents with macros delivered via phishing emails as a primary initial access vector.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: PowerShell used for payload delivery, lateral movement, and post-exploitation tasks.
    • T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution: Browser and plugin vulnerabilities exploited via exploit kits to execute the Maze payload on victim endpoints.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1218.011 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32: Rundll32 used to load malicious DLLs and bypass application control solutions.
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: Mimikatz deployed to harvest credentials from LSASS memory.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: Active Directory enumeration to identify all hosts within the domain for maximum encryption coverage.
    • T1046 Network Service Discovery: Network scanning to enumerate hosts and services for lateral movement.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: RDP used for lateral movement across the network with harvested credentials.
    • T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares: PsExec and SMB shares used to propagate the Maze payload to remote systems.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Maze pioneered the double extortion model — among the first ransomware groups to exfiltrate data before encryption and publish it on a dedicated leak site ('Maze News') to pressure victims into paying.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: Cobalt Strike used for C2 communications over HTTPS.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Maze uses ChaCha20 for file encryption with RSA-2048 for key protection. Active 2019-2020, Maze was the pioneer of the double extortion model that became the ransomware industry standard. The group formally announced retirement in November 2020; affiliates migrated to Egregor.
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Volume Shadow Copies removed; Windows Backup catalog deleted to prevent recovery.
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Security software terminated and disabled using batch scripts prior to ransomware deployment.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 21 Oct 2019 to 11 Sep 2020

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

1 known site(s): 0 online, 1 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 1

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

DECRYPT-FILES.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
Attention!

----------------------------
| What happened?
----------------------------

All your files, documents, photos, databases, and other important data are safely encrypted with reliable algorithms.
You cannot access the files right now. But do not worry. You have a chance! It is easy to recover in a few steps.

----------------------------
| How to get my files back?
----------------------------

The only method to restore your files is to purchase a unique for you private key which is securely stored on our servers. 
To contact us and purchase the key you have to visit our website in a hidden TOR network.

There are general 2 ways to reach us:

1) [Recommended] Using hidden TOR network.

 a) Download a special TOR browser: [link]
 b) Install the TOR Browser.
 c) Open the TOR Browser.
 d) Open our website in the TOR browser: [.onion address]
 e) Follow the instructions on this page. 

2) If you have any problems connecting or using TOR network

 a) Open our website: [link]
 b) Follow the instructions on this page.

Warning: the second (2) method can be blocked in some countries. That is why the first (1) method is recommended to use. 

On this page, you will see instructions on how to make a free decryption test and how to pay.
Also it has a live chat with our operators and support team.

----------------------------
| What about guarantees?
----------------------------

We understand your stress and worry.
So you have a FREE opportunity to test a service by instantly decrypting for free three files on your computer!
If you have any problems our friendly support team is always here to assist you in a live chat!


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THIS IS A SPECIAL BLOCK WITH A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION! DO NOT TOUCH IT WE NEED IT TO IDENTIFY AND AUTHORIZE YOU
---BEGIN MAZE KEY---
[snip]
---END MAZE KEY---
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 1

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

Maze.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

Impact and victims

The group maze has 2 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

2known victims
1in Brazil
2sectors hit
Most attacked sectors
Financial Services1
Government & Defense1
Most affected countries
🇧🇷 Brazil1
🇨🇷 Costa Rica1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planGovernment & Defense · BR · 2020-06-10
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · CR · 2020-05-01

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

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