CVE-2024-29037
Default secret use for initial deployment
En resumen
Los gráficos Helm de DataHub usaban una clave secreta predeterminada y públicamente conocida para crear tokens de seguridad durante la implementación inicial, permitiendo a atacantes falsificar tokens de autenticación y obtener acceso no autorizado.
Detalle técnico
CWE-1394 (Uso de Algoritmo Criptográfico Roto o Arriesgado): Las versiones 0.1.143 a 0.2.181 de datahub-helm se desplegaban con claves de firma estáticas codificadas para la generación de tokens de acceso personal cuando la Autenticación del Servicio de Metadatos estaba habilitada; un atacante que conociera el algoritmo público y la clave predeterminada podría generar tokens válidos para suplantar usuarios. Las implementaciones donde la autenticación se habilitó manualmente mediante variables de entorno, eludiendo protecciones de helm, presentaban mayor riesgo.
Resumen generado y traducido por IA a partir de la descripción oficial.
datahub-helm provides the Kubernetes Helm charts for deploying Datahub and its dependencies on a Kubernetes cluster. Starting in version 0.1.143 and prior to version 0.2.182, due to configuration issues in the helm chart, if there was a successful initial deployment during a limited window of time, personal access tokens were possibly created with a default secret key. Since the secret key is a static, publicly available value, someone could inspect the algorithm used to generate personal access tokens and generate their own for an instance. Deploying with Metadata Service Authentication enabled would have been difficult during window of releases. If someone circumvented the helm settings and manually set Metadata Service Authentication to be enabled using environment variables directly, this would skip over the autogeneration logic for the Kubernetes Secrets and DataHub GMS would default to the signing key specified statically in the application.yml. Most deployments probably did not attempt to circumvent the helm settings to enable Metadata Service Authentication during this time, so impact is most likely limited. Any deployments with Metadata Service Authentication enabled should ensure that their secret values are properly randomized. Version 0.2.182 contains a patch for this issue. As a workaround, one may reset the token signing key to be a random value, which will invalidate active personal access tokens.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N