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CVE-2025-27636mediumexplotación observadaCWE-178

Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering

77Vexday Risk Score

Prioriza la corrección. Ella explotación observada por VulnCheck y tiene prueba de concepto pública.

ssvc Actcvss 5.6epss 81%
de la publicación al arma0 días
Publicada en NVD9 mar
1ª PoC9 mar
VulnCheck+29d
probabilidad de explotación
81%top 1% de las CVE
explotación observada
síVulnCheck
3 exploit(s) público(s)
Lo que declaran los fabricantes (VEX)

Declaraciones oficiales de los fabricantes en formato CSAF/VEX: si su producto está afectado, ya corregido o descartado — y por qué. Es afirmación del fabricante, no juicio de Vexday.

Afectado
3 productos (13 componentes)
Red Hat Fuse 7 · Red Hat Integration Camel K 1 · Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4
workaround: Remove headers from your Camel routes; this can be accomplished in several ways, including globally or per route.
Corregido
2 productos
Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 4.8 for Quarkus 3.15 · Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.8.5 for Spring Boot
No afectado
6 productos — porque el código vulnerable no está presente en el producto
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8 · Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack · Red Hat Process Automation 7 · Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 · Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3 · y otros 1
Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel components under particular conditions. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 through <= 4.10.1, from 4.8.0 through <= 4.8.4, from 3.10.0 through <= 3.22.3. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases. This vulnerability is present in Camel's default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, to call another method on the bean, than was coded in the application. In the camel-jms component, then a malicious header can be used to send the message to another queue (on the same broker) than was coded in the application. This could also be seen by using the camel-exec component The attacker would need to inject custom headers, such as HTTP protocols. So if you have Camel applications that are directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include malicious HTTP headers in the HTTP requests that are send to the Camel application. All the known Camel HTTP component such as camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http, and camel-netty-http would be vulnerable out of the box. In these conditions an attacker could be able to forge a Camel header name and make the bean component invoking other methods in the same bean. In terms of usage of the default header filter strategy the list of components using that is: * camel-activemq * camel-activemq6 * camel-amqp * camel-aws2-sqs * camel-azure-servicebus * camel-cxf-rest * camel-cxf-soap * camel-http * camel-jetty * camel-jms * camel-kafka * camel-knative * camel-mail * camel-nats * camel-netty-http * camel-platform-http * camel-rest * camel-sjms * camel-spring-rabbitmq * camel-stomp * camel-tahu * camel-undertow * camel-xmpp The vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with "Camel", "camel", or "org.apache.camel.".  Mitigation: You can easily work around this in your Camel applications by removing the headers in your Camel routes. There are many ways of doing this, also globally or per route. This means you could use the removeHeaders EIP, to filter out anything like "cAmel, cAMEL" etc, or in general everything not starting with "Camel", "camel" or "org.apache.camel.".
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
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