CVE-2026-115407: fallo crítico en Eclipse Foundation github.com/eclipse-keypont/c…
Publicada el
Seguir esta CVE+ Monitorear github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11+ Monitorear github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2
Aviso por correo cuando entre en el KEV, tenga PoC pública o suba de nota.
28Vexday Risk Score
Sin señal de explotación. Ningún artefacto público de explotación conocido hasta ahora.
ssvc Trackcvss 9.1epss 0.8%
In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8`, `github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1` and `github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5`), the `cipher.AEAD` returned by `SecretKey.NewGCM()` passes whatever nonce it is given straight to `CK_GCM_PARAMS` without checking its length against `NonceSize()`, and accepts an empty nonce. On a token that accepts a zero-length GCM IV — SoftHSM2 does — every `Seal` with an empty nonce encrypts under the same IV, reusing the keystream and exposing the GHASH authentication key, which allows forgeries. Separately, `Config.UseGCMIVFromHSM` sends a NULL IV with length zero to the token unless `GCMIVFromHSMControl.SupplyIvForHSMGCMEncrypt` is also set, so the token has nowhere to write the IV it generates: a `Seal` with a non-empty nonce panics after the plaintext has already been encrypted, and a `Seal` with an empty nonce returns ciphertext under an empty IV without error. On the v1 line HSM-IV mode additionally never copies the token-generated IV back to the caller, so the caller keeps its own nonce while the data was encrypted under another one.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N