CVE-2026-46333
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Productos afectados
Linux · LinuxPoCs públicas encontradas — 5
githubgithub.com/0xBlackash/CVE-2026-46333★ 31githubgithub.com/KaraZajac/CHARON★ 6githubgithub.com/studiogangster/CVE-2026-46333★ 5githubgithub.com/Aurillium/public-passwd★ 1cve_referencegithub.com/0xdeadbeefnetwork/ssh-keysign-pwn/no verificado⚠ Recursos públicos, para evaluar la exposición de sistemas que controlas o estás autorizado a probar. Prueba solo con autorización.
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https://github.com/0xdeadbeefnetwork/ssh-keysign-pwn/https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01363cb3fbd0238ffdeb09f53e9039c9edf8a730https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15b828a46f305ae9f05a7c16914b3ce273474205https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a93a4fac7b6051d3be7cd1b015fe7320cd0404dhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31e62c2ebbfdc3fe3dbdf5e02c92a9dc67087a3ahttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4709234fd1b95136ceb789f639b1e7ea5de1b181https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e5b51e74a40d377bcd3081dd33fbaa0e1aa7e3dhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f907d345bae8f4b3f004c5abc56bf2dfb851ea7https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93d4ba49d18e3d7fb41a9927c2d0cca5e9dfefd6https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/05/msg00032.htmlhttps://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/05/msg00035.htmlhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/15/9