Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks
21Vexday Risk Score
Sin señal de explotación. Ningún artefacto público de explotación conocido hasta ahora.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.4epss 0.2%
probabilidad de explotación
0.2%top 92% de las CVE
explotación observada
noninguna fuente lo reporta
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Productos afectados
netty · nettyReferencias
https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/5b68c61f37aa4a3045cba624cbea239655c9003bhttps://github.com/netty/netty/commit/bb2ff68a1fb71cb4b0eb9a9e17b66c52aff680c6https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Finalhttps://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Finalhttps://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg