Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions
33Vexday Risk Score
Sin señal de explotación. Ella tiene prueba de concepto pública.
ssvc Attendcvss 6.3epss 0.6%
de la publicación al arma5 días
Publicada en NVD28 jul
1ª PoC+5d
probabilidad de explotación
0.6%top 53% de las CVE
explotación observada
noninguna fuente lo reporta
1 exploit(s) público(s)
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-byte request driving a dompdf render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Productos afectados
dompdf · dompdfPoCs públicas encontradas — 1
githubgithub.com/far00t01/CVE-2026-59941★ 0⚠ Recursos públicos, para evaluar la exposición de sistemas que controlas o estás autorizado a probar. Prueba solo con autorización.