Grav before 2.0.2 Decompression Bomb via Forged ZIP Size
21Vexday Risk Score
Sin señal de explotación. Ningún artefacto público de explotación conocido hasta ahora.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.1epss 0.2%
probabilidad de explotación
0.2%top 84% de las CVE
explotación observada
noninguna fuente lo reporta
Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Productos afectados
getgrav · grav