Woodpecker: Privilege escalation via unrestricted serviceAccountName in the Kubernetes backend
28Vexday Risk Score
Sin señal de explotación. Ningún artefacto público de explotación conocido hasta ahora.
ssvc Trackcvss 9epss 0.2%
probabilidad de explotación
0.2%top 94% de las CVE
explotación observada
noninguna fuente lo reporta
Woodpecker is a CI/CD engine. From 1.0.0 until 3.16.0, pipeline/backend/kubernetes/backend_options.go defines backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountName, and the Kubernetes backend in pipeline/backend/kubernetes/pod.go copies that pipeline-step value directly into the pod specification without administrator authorization. Any user with Push permission on a connected repository can therefore run pipeline pods under an arbitrary ServiceAccount in the pipeline namespace and inherit that account's RBAC permissions. When a privileged ServiceAccount is reachable, the attacker can exfiltrate secrets such as database credentials, API keys, and TLS certificates and may take over the cluster. This issue is fixed in version 3.16.0.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Productos afectados
woodpecker-ci · woodpeckerReferencias
https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/commit/5df9d52260626c074c6caafb2dc83d3bc6b53be1https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/commit/609ba481b5e912f59aaae8ca7bc22b44523c5e37https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6792https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/releases/tag/v3.16.0https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/security/advisories/GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8