nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header Every LLCP PDU begins with a two-byte header (DSAP/SSAP + PTYPE), but the receive path never checked that a frame is at least LLCP_HEADER_SIZE bytes before parsing it. nfc_llcp_rx_skb() reads the header via nfc_llcp_ptype()/nfc_llcp_dsap()/ nfc_llcp_ssap(), which dereference pdu->data[0] and pdu->data[1], and a CONNECT or CC PDU then computes tlv_array_len = skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE; as a size_t and hands it to the TLV walk. When the frame is shorter than the header the subtraction wraps to a huge value and the walk runs far past the buffer, an out-of-bounds read. A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP. Guard the common receive choke point __nfc_llcp_recv(), shared by both the target (nfc_llcp_data_received()) and initiator (nfc_llcp_recv()) paths, so a short skb is dropped before the rx_work worker parses it. Use pskb_may_pull() rather than a skb->len test so the two header bytes are guaranteed to sit in the skb linear area even for a non-linear skb, matching how the sibling NCI and HCI receive paths validate their headers. Reproduced with a KFENCE out-of-bounds read via /dev/virtual_nci on linux-next. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).