CVE-2026-14986: falha de média gravidade em zephyrproject zephyr

The ITE it51xxx I2C driver, when operating as an I2C target (slave) in buffer mode (CONFIG_I2C_TARGET + CONFIG_I2C_TARGET_BUFFER_MODE), copies host-supplied write data into the fixed-size data->target_in_buffer inside its target FIFO interrupt handler target_i2c_isr_fifo() in drivers/i2c/i2c_ite_it51xxx.c. The copy loop stores to target_in_buffer[i + data->w_index] and only checks data->w_index against sizeof(data->target_in_buffer) after the write has already completed, so the bounds check cannot prevent the overflow. The running index data->w_index accumulates count bytes on every FIFO-fill interrupt of an ongoing transaction and is reset to zero only on a STOP or timeout condition. An I2C host that streams a single write transaction longer than the buffer (default CONFIG_I2C_TARGET_IT51XXX_MAX_BUF_SIZE = 256 bytes) drives data->w_index past the end of the buffer, and each subsequent host byte is written out of bounds into the adjacent data->target_out_buffer and following static device data. The trigger is a malicious or misbehaving I2C master on the same bus (for example a compromised application processor or a rogue device on an exposed I2C bus); no software privilege on the victim is required and the handler runs in the target's kernel/firmware context. Because both the written values and the overflow length are attacker-controlled, this is an out-of-bounds write that can crash the controller or be shaped toward code execution. The fix adds a pre-write bounds check in target_i2c_fifo_read_to_buf() that aborts and resets the FIFO before any out-of-bounds store.