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CVE-2026-53604highCWE-212CWE-316

nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths

21Vexday Risk Score

Sem sinal de exploração. Nenhum artefato público de exploração conhecido até agora.

ssvc Trackcvss 7.1epss 0.1%
probabilidade de exploração
0.1%top 98% das CVEs
exploração observada
nãonenhuma fonte reporta
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Produtos afetados
forgekeep · nebula-mesh