mealie: DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU in SSRF Guard Allows Internal Network and Cloud Metadata Access
13Vexday Risk Score
Sem sinal de exploração. Nenhum artefato público de exploração conhecido até agora.
ssvc Trackcvss 5.3epss 0.2%
probabilidade de exploração
0.2%top 95% das CVEs
exploração observada
nãonenhuma fonte reporta
Mealie's AsyncSafeTransport SSRF guard (mealie/pkgs/safehttp/transport.py) resolves a target hostname once, checks the resolved IP against private-range rules, but then issues the actual outbound HTTP request using the original hostname, which the underlying async transport re-resolves independently. Because the validated IP is never pinned to the actual connection, a DNS-rebinding attacker (returning a public IP to the validation lookup and a private/metadata IP to the real connection) defeats the guard. This is reachable by any authenticated user via /api/recipes/create/url, /api/recipes/test-scrape-url, and /api/recipes/{slug}/image, and the scraper reflects fetched content back to the requester, allowing an authenticated user to read internal HTTP services and cloud-metadata endpoints.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Produtos afetados
mealie-recipes · mealieReferências
https://github.com/mealie-recipes/mealie