blaze: Chunked-body trailer fields promoted into Request.headers in blaze-server (front-end header-sanitization bypass)
18Vexday Risk Score
Sem sinal de exploração. Nenhum artefato público de exploração conhecido até agora.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.4
probabilidade de exploração
—
exploração observada
nãonenhuma fonte reporta
blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42, blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into Request.headers. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names and values, including X-Forwarded-For and internal authorization headers, that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application. Any http4s application using BlazeServerBuilder over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers, including X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-Host, is affected. If a fronting proxy strips or normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists, rate limits, or auditing, forge the https scheme, or inject internal authorization headers. A promoted Connection: close trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Produtos afetados
http4s · blaze