CVE-2026-75595criticalCWE-754

CVE-2026-75595: falha crítica em netty

Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext

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28Vexday Risk Score

Sem sinal de exploração. Nenhum artefato público de exploração conhecido até agora.

ssvc Trackcvss 9.1epss 0.3%
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Produtos afetados
netty · netty