Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN
New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and
state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the
dangling parent reference.
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown,
due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect
l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm
l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)
l2cap_chan_close
l2cap_sock_teardown_cb
pchan->state = BT_CLOSED
l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------> l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)
l2cap_new_connection
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb
l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) <-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan)
l2cap_sock_kill(parent) /* bt_sk(sk)->parent dangling */
Fix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes
where missing, to avoid data races.
Although the data races on pchan->state should be fixed too, this
defensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Produtos afetados
Linux · LinuxReferências
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a3a27aaf19bf069720e024ce6fde54e6bf80df9https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/491e4c60017969b053888029998d2a61f298986ahttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87276dc15b559d32757a43b4415c8445fbae06c4https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf61a65c6093970e3b50031c4b79ebf3bd411ebahttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c47339e169bf4a0a4cfabb91351471f67744c2bchttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4bfa78fd67929b62b02013c107973e0c5b7aa9a