RansomwareTargets Brazil

alphv

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About the group

The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language.<BR> <BR> Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations).<BR> <BR> As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data.<BR> <BR> ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attack

Similar names and other brands

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: In some attacks, threat actors utilized ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207).
    • T1133 External Remote Services: As an initial attack vector, insecure RDP and VPNs were exploited.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: BlackCat affiliates may purchase access to victims' network infrastructure on underground forums.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1053 Scheduled Task/Job: When deploying ransomware on the victim's network infrastructure, BlackCat affiliates may leverage group policies, resulting in the creation of a scheduled task (on each host) initiating the ransomware.
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: To disrupt IIS, delete volume shadow copies, disable recovery, clear Windows event logs, etc., BlackCat ransomware utilizes command shell to execute appropriate commands.
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: LockBit affiliates use batch scripts to execute malicious commands.
    • T1072 Windows Management Instrumentation: Adversaries may use wmic to gather information and execute various commands, including deleting volume shadow copies. They may also use Impacket's wmiexec module to execute commands and move laterally across the network.
    • T1106 Native API: BlackCat uses native API.
    • T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution: BlackCat Ransomware for Windows can self-propagate on the local network using legitimate PsExec utility (contained within its body), which creates a temporary system service.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: Legitimate accounts obtained by adversaries may be used to ensure persistence in the compromised infrastructure.
    • T1547 Server Software Component: Successful exploitation of ProxyShell vulnerabilities allowed adversaries to place a web shell on a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange server.
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: To escalate privileges, BlackCat may use stolen legitimate accounts specified in configuration data.
    • T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token: To escalate privileges, BlackCat ransomware may initiate its process using stolen authentication data and the CreateProcessWithLogonW function.
    • T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control: To bypass UAC, BlackCat ransomware may elevate privileges using the ICMLuaUtil COM interface, as well as utilize the Masquerade PEB method.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information: BlackCat ransomware uses obfuscation.
    • T1036 Masquerading: Adversaries use a renamed SoftPerfect Network Scanner executable to svchost.exe.
    • T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information: BlackCat decrypts configuration data, as well as decrypts and unpacks legitimate PsExec utility and an additional BAT file contained within the ransomware body.
    • T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: For anti-analysis (including in a sandbox), ALPHV MORPH checks the access token value of the command line parameter. Its value must contain the correct first 16 characters used to decrypt BlackCat's configuration data.
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: Adversaries may dump the LSASS process to obtain authentication data using legitimate tools (procdump, comsvcs.dll).
    • T1552 Unsecured Credentials: Adversaries may use NirSoft utilities to obtain authentication data from registry and file.
    • T1555 Credentials from Password Stores: Adversaries may use NirSoft utilities to extract authentication data from web browsers and other storage spaces.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1020 Automated Exfiltration: After access is obtained, files from target hosts are automatically uploaded to the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA using the Rclone utility.
    • T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits: To avoid exceeding data size limits and triggering security controls, stolen data may be sent in fixed-size blocks.
    • T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: When using Cobalt Strike, attackers can send collected information through the Cobalt Strike server communication channels.
    • T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol: Attackers may use the ExMatter exfiltration tool, which sends stolen data to specified SFTP and WebDav resources in the ExMatter configuration.
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Attackers use the Rclone sync utility to upload stolen data to the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1485 Data Destruction: If credentials to access a victim's chat leak, BlackCat affiliates can delete encryption keys, rendering file decryption impossible.
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: BlackCat encrypts the content of files on the local system as well as on available network resources.
    • T1489 Service Stop: BlackCat stops security, backup, database, email, and other specified services in the configuration.
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: BlackCat deletes Windows volume shadow copies using vssadmin and wmic, disables recovery in the Windows boot menu using bccedit, and empties the Recycle Bin. BlackCat can stop backup services and destroy virtual machine snapshots.
    • T1498 Network Denial of Service: If the victim refuses to pay the ransom, BlackCat may conduct DDoS attacks against the victim's infrastructure.
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1112 Modify Registry: To propagate, BlackCat uses PsExec to modify the MaxMpxCt system registry parameter to increase the number of failed network requests for each client.
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: To avoid detection, adversaries terminate processes and services related to security software and antivirus.
    • T1685.005 Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs: Using wevtutil, BlackCat can clear all Windows event logs on a compromised host.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 09 Sep 2021 to 03 Mar 2024

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

4 known site(s): 0 online, 4 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 4

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

alphv1.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
Hello, [snip]

>> What happened?

Important files on your network was ENCRYPTED and now they have "${EXTENSION}" extension.
In order to recover your files you need to follow instructions below.

>> Sensitive Data

Sensitive data on your network was DOWNLOADED.
If you DON'T WANT your sensitive data to be PUBLISHED you have to act quickly.

Data includes:
- MICROS DATABASE, Accounting, Drawings
- Check Copies, Engineering, HR, Banking Information
- Payroll Scan, Sales and Marketing, Financia
- And more...

>> CAUTION

DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES YOURSELF.
DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA.
YOU MAY DAMAGE YOUR FILES, IT WILL RESULT IN PERMANENT DATA LOSS.

>> What should I do next?

1) Download and install Tor Browser from: [link]
2) Navigate to: [.onion address]
alphv2.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
>> What happened?

Important files on your network was ENCRYPTED and now they have "${EXTENSION}" extension.
In order to recover your files you need to follow instructions below.

>> Sensitive Data

Sensitive data on your system was DOWNLOADED.
If you DON'T WANT your sensitive data to be PUBLISHED you have to act quickly.

Data includes:
- Employees personal data, CVs, DL, SSN.
- Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services.
- Private financial information including: clients data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements.
- Manufacturing documents including: datagrams, schemas, drawings in solidworks format
- And more...

Private URL: [.onion address]


>> CAUTION

DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES YOURSELF.
DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA.
YOU MAY DAMAGE YOUR FILES, IT WILL RESULT IN PERMANENT DATA LOSS.

>> What should I do next?

Follow these simple steps to get everything back to normal:
1) Download and install Tor Browser from: [link]
2) Navigate to: [.onion address]
alphv3.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
>> Introduction

Important files on your system was ENCRYPTED and now they have have "${EXTENSION}" extension.
In order to recover your files you need to follow instructions below.

>> Sensitive Data

Sensitive data on your system was DOWNLOADED and it will be PUBLISHED if you refuse to cooperate.

Data includes:
- Employees personal data, CVs, DL, SSN.
- Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services.
- Financial information including clients data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements.
- Complete datagrams/schemas/drawings for manufacturing in solidworks format
- And more...

Private preview is published here: [.onion address]


>> CAUTION

DO NOT MODIFY FILES YOURSELF.
DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA.
YOU MAY DAMAGE YOUR FILES, IT WILL RESULT IN PERMANENT DATA LOSS.
YOUR DATA IS STRONGLY ENCRYPTED, YOU CAN NOT DECRYPT IT WITHOUT CIPHER KEY.

>> Recovery procedure

Follow these simple steps to get in touch and recover your data:
1) Download and install Tor Browser from: [link]
2) Navigate to: [.onion address]
JX34qQm7.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
Data on Your network was exfiltrated and encrypted.

Modifying encrypted files will result in permanent data loss!

Get in touch with us ASAP to get an offer:
1. Download and install Tor Browser from [link]
2. Access User Panel at [.onion address]
 THIS IS YOUR PRIVATE USER PANEL ADDRESS, DO NOT SHARE IT WITH ANYONE!



See also:
 Visit our Blog: [.onion address]
 Social Media: [link]
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 1

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

sekoia.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • BlackCat · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

Impact and victims

The group alphv has 32 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

32known victims
11in Brazil
8sectors hit
Most attacked sectors
Financial Services6
Government & Defense5
Retail & E-Commerce3
Agriculture and Food Production3
Professional Services3
Technology3
Education3
Energy & Utilities2
Most affected countries
🇧🇷 Brazil11
🇲🇽 Mexico7
🇨🇴 Colombia3
🇪🇨 Ecuador2
🇦🇷 Argentina2
🇨🇱 Chile2
🇩🇴 Dominican Republic2
🇬🇹 Guatemala1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · MX · 2024-03-03
Name on the SOC planGovernment & Defense · BR · 2023-12-24
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · BR · 2023-11-24
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · BR · 2023-11-06
Name on the SOC planTechnology · BR · 2023-10-09
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · MX · 2023-09-12
Name on the SOC planManufacturing · MX · 2023-08-04
Name on the SOC planHealthcare · DO · 2023-08-04
Name on the SOC planTechnology · AR · 2023-07-12
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · MX · 2023-06-10
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · AR · 2023-05-13
Name on the SOC planManufacturing · BR · 2023-05-05
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · CO · 2023-05-02
Name on the SOC planEducation · BR · 2023-04-26
Name on the SOC planTransportation · BR · 2023-04-21

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

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