Ransomware

bianlian

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About the group

BianLian ransomware operations began in late 2021. The group practices multi-pronged extortion, demanding payment for a decryptor, as well as the non-release of stolen data. The ransomware group hosts a public, TOR-based, blog to post victim identities and stolen data. Somewhat unique to BianLian at the time of their launch was their inclusion of an I2P mirror for their blog.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Impacket
Credential theft
RDP Recognizer
Discovery
Advanced IP ScannerAdvanced Port ScannerPingCastleSharpSharesSoftPerfect NetScanWKTools
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
PsExec
Remote access (RMM)
AmmyyAdminAnyDeskAteraScreenConnectSplashtopTeamViewer
Exfiltration
MEGARClone

How the group attacks

  • Execution TA0002
    • T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries.
    • T1204 User Execution: An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027.002 Software Packing: Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
    • T1036 Masquerading: Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools.
    • T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1082 System Information Discovery: An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
    • T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery: Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.
    • T1518.001 Security Software Discovery: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 14 Jul 2022 to 31 Mar 2025

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

3 known site(s): 0 online, 3 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 1

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

Look at this instruction.txt · 4 contact(s) masked
Your network systems were attacked and encrypted. Contact us in order to restore your data. Don't make any changes in your file structure: touch no files, don't try to recover by yourself, that may lead to it's complete loss.

To contact us you have to download "tox" messenger: [link]

Add user with the following ID to get your instructions:
[Tox ID]

Alternative way: [email]

Your ID: [snip]

You should know that we have been downloading data from your network for a significant time before the attack: financial, client, business, post, technical and personal files.
In 10 days - it will be posted at our site [.onion address] / [.onion address] with links send to your clients, partners, competitors and news agencies, that will lead to a negative impact on your company: potential financial, business and reputational loses.
 ---!!!---
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 202

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

Indicators (IOCs)
MD5 8
  • 08e76dd242e64bb31aec09db8464b28f
  • 0c756fc8f34e409650cd910b5e2a3f00
  • 14da9c0c4e3ac3b9abb2c48b37bece19
  • 15cdfa777aa2db35229410d2fa9fb92e
  • 36171704cde087f839b10c2465d864e1
  • 7be61ea851f894d26bf57cf0f1f55ed6
  • b3cdf0489ff37fe65141be9363b9489c
  • d10e0387e3d55dc1f82c23719e2b168b
IP and port 191
  • 103.125.217.129:80
  • 103.30.77.80:8443
  • 104.168.140.238:443
  • 104.168.151.112:443
  • 104.200.67.252:3966
  • 104.200.67.252:50955
  • 104.200.72.146:3389
  • 104.200.72.146:80

and 183 more: see them all in the IOC search

2 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

bianlian.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

U.S. Treasury sanctions (OFAC)

OFAC press releases that sanction people or companies and tie them to this group in the text itself.

According to OFAC, facilitating a ransom payment to sanctioned people or companies may violate U.S. sanctions. OFAC advisory. Not legal advice.

Impact and victims

The group bianlian has 1 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

1known victims
1sectors hit
Most attacked sectors
Manufacturing1
Most affected countries
🇦🇷 Argentina1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planManufacturing · AR · 2024-08-28

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

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