Ransomware

conti

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Conti is an extremely damaging ransomware due to the speed with which it encrypts data and spreads to other systems. It was first observed in 2020 and it is thought to be led by a Russia-based cybercrime group that goes under the Wizard Spider pseudonym. In early May 2022, the US government announced a reward of up to $10 million for information on the Conti ransomware gang.

Similar names and other brands

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Cobalt StrikeMetasploitMeterpreterPowerShell EmpirePowerSploitRubeus
Credential theft
MimikatzProcDumpRouter ScanSharpChrome
Discovery
AdFindBloodhoundPowerViewSeatbeltShareFinderSharpViewSoftPerfect NetScan
Defense evasion
GMERPCHunter
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
BITSAdminNTDS Utility (ntdsutil)PsExecWMIC
Remote access (RMM)
AnyDeskAteraSplashtop
Exfiltration
DropfilesMEGAQaz[.]imRCloneSendspaceWinSCP

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Use of credentials purchased via Initial Access Brokers or harvested through prior compromises.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: Exploitation of Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228), ProxyShell, and Fortinet vulnerabilities to gain initial access to victim networks.
    • T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment: Conti extensively uses BazarLoader and TrickBot delivered via spear-phishing emails with malicious Office document attachments containing macros.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: WMI leveraged for remote command execution across victim infrastructure.
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: PowerShell used extensively for payload deployment, Cobalt Strike beacon staging, and post-exploitation activity.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account: New domain accounts created for persistent access and to facilitate lateral movement with elevated privileges.
    • T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys: Registry Run keys used to maintain persistence of backdoor tools across reboots.
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation: Exploitation of PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) and ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) to escalate to SYSTEM or Domain Admin.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1218.011 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32: Rundll32 used to execute malicious DLLs and evade application control.
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: Mimikatz used to dump LSASS memory for credential harvesting across compromised hosts.
    • T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS: Active Directory NTDS.dit extracted to obtain all domain account password hashes.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1046 Network Service Discovery: Network scanning using Nmap, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and custom scripts to enumerate the internal network.
    • T1482 Domain Trust Discovery: BloodHound used to enumerate Active Directory and identify attack paths to high-value targets.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: RDP used for lateral movement using harvested credentials across the victim network.
    • T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares: PsExec used to deploy Cobalt Strike beacons and the ransomware payload across the network.
  • Collection TA0009
    • T1005 Data from Local System: Sensitive documents, financial records, and PII collected from compromised hosts prior to encryption.
    • T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: 7-Zip used to compress and archive stolen data for exfiltration.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Rclone used to exfiltrate stolen data to MEGA and other cloud storage providers as part of the double extortion model.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: Cobalt Strike beacons communicate via HTTPS to actor-controlled team servers for C2 operations.
    • T1219 Remote Access Software: AnyDesk and Atera agent installed as persistent backdoors for remote access.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Conti ransomware uses ChaCha20 for file encryption with RSA-4096 for key protection. Multi-threaded encryption leverages up to 32 simultaneous threads for rapid encryption. Operates as RaaS.
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Volume Shadow Copies deleted via vssadmin and wmic; Windows Backup Catalog deleted; recovery mode disabled via bcdedit.
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Windows Defender, AV products, and EDR tools disabled via PowerShell, registry modification, or Group Policy Objects.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 31 Jul 2020 to 07 Jun 2022

Exploited vulnerabilities 1

CVEs this group is known to exploit, with the source and confidence of each next to it. Ordered by confidence and real-world severity.

The group's sites

3 known site(s): 0 online, 3 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 4

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

conti1.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
All of your files are currently encrypted by CONTI strain. 

As you know (if you don't - just "google it"), all of the data that has been encrypted by our software cannot be recovered by any means without contacting our team directly. 
If you try to use any additional recovery software - the files might be damaged, so if you are willing to try - try it on the data of the lowest value.

To make sure that we REALLY CAN get your data back - we offer you to decrypt 2 random files completely free of charge.

You can contact our team directly for further instructions through our website :

TOR VERSION :
(you should download and install TOR browser first [link]

[.onion address]

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE!
Just in case, if you try to ignore us. We've downloaded a pack of your internal data and are ready to publish it on out news website if you do not respond. So it will be better for both sides if you contact us as soon as possible.


---BEGIN ID---
[snip]
---END ID---
conti2.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
All of your files are currently encrypted by CONTI strain. 

As you know (if you don't - just "google it"), all of the data that has been encrypted by our software cannot be recovered by any means without contacting our team directly. 
If you try to use any additional recovery software - the files might be damaged, so if you are willing to try - try it on the data of the lowest value.

To make sure that we REALLY CAN get your data back - we offer you to decrypt 2 random files completely free of charge.

You can contact our team directly for further instructions through our website :

TOR VERSION :
(you should download and install TOR browser first [link]

[.onion address]

HTTPS VERSION :
[link]

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE!
Just in case, if you try to ignore us. We've downloaded a pack of your internal data and are ready to publish it on out news website if you do not respond. So it will be better for both sides if you contact us as soon as possible.


---BEGIN ID---
[snip]
---END ID---
conti3.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
All of your files are currently encrypted by CONTI ransomware. 
If you try to use any additional recovery software - the files might be damaged or lost.

To make sure that we REALLY CAN recover data - we offer you to decrypt samples. 

You can contact us for further instructions through our website : 

TOR VERSION : 
(you should download and install TOR browser first [link] 

[.onion address] 

HTTPS VERSION : 
[link] 

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE! 
Just in case, if you try to ignore us. We've downloaded your data and are ready to publish it on out news website if you do not respond. So it will be better for both sides if you contact us ASAP.

---BEGIN ID---
[snip]
---END ID---
conti4.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
All of your files are currently encrypted by CONTI strain. If you don't know who we are - just "Google it."

As you already know, all of your data has been encrypted by our software.
It cannot be recovered by any means without contacting our team directly.

DON'T TRY TO RECOVER your data by yourselves. Any attempt to recover your data (including the usage of the additional recovery software) can damage your files. However,
if you want to try - we recommend choosing the data of the lowest value.

DON'T TRY TO IGNORE us. We've downloaded a pack of your internal data and are ready to publish it on our news website if you do not respond.
So it will be better for both sides if you contact us as soon as possible.

DON'T TRY TO CONTACT feds or any recovery companies.
We have our informants in these structures, so any of your complaints will be immediately directed to us.
So if you will hire any recovery company for negotiations or send requests to the police/FBI/investigators, we will consider this as a hostile intent and initiate the publication of whole compromised data immediately.

To prove that we REALLY CAN get your data back - we offer you to decrypt two random files completely free of charge.

You can contact our team directly for further instructions through our website :

TOR VERSION :
(you should download and install TOR browser first [link]

[.onion address]

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE!
We will speak only with an authorized person. It can be the CEO, top management, etc.
In case you are not such a person - DON'T CONTACT US! Your decisions and action can result in serious harm to your company!
Inform your supervisors and stay calm!
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 1

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

Conti.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Negotiation 32

What the leaked negotiation chats show about the group: how much it asks at first, how much it accepts and how often a payment happened.

32
Leaked chats
$980K
Initial demand (median)
in 31 chat(s)
$280K
Negotiated amount (median)
in 21 chat(s)
64%
Discount (median)
in 21 chat(s)
34%
Payment happened
11 of 32
45
Messages per chat (median)

The sample is only the chats that leaked, not every attack by the group. Amounts are as the group wrote them; the medians use only the dollar amounts.

DateDemandNegotiatedPaidMessages
17 Dec 2021N/AN/Ano27
05 Dec 2021$950,000$170,000yes63
12 Nov 2021$1,950,000N/Ano32
08 Nov 2021$1,200,000$840,000no32
23 Sep 2021$100,000N/Ano14
04 Sep 2021$980,000$735,000no17
02 Sep 2021$850,000$635,000no43
20 Aug 2021$980,000$350,000yes50
12 Aug 2021$300,650$150,000yes46
05 Aug 2021$3,000,000$200,000no47
15 Jul 2021$720,000N/Ano10
08 Jul 2021$350,000$280,000no25
28 Jun 2021$1,250,000N/Ano34
11 Jun 2021$600,000$256,000yes48
02 Jun 2021$1,700,000N/Ano81
20 May 2021$900,000$325,000yes101
17 May 2021$1,350,000$350,000no69
17 May 2021$400,000$200,000yes56
13 May 2021$200,000$100,000yes78
28 Apr 2021$4,000,000N/Ano13
26 Apr 2021$1,700,000N/Ano12
16 Mar 2021$920,000$172,000yes63
15 Mar 2021$1,100,000$100,000yes49
05 Mar 2021$900,000$450,000no45
19 Feb 2021$1,500,000$1,050,000no12
26 Jan 2021$1,200,000N/Ano9
07 Jan 2021$900,000$162,792yes139
30 Dec 2020$8,500,000$450,000yes146
21 Nov 2020$14,000,000N/Ano6
09 Nov 2020$15,000,000$4,100,000no255

and 2 more chat(s)

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you read the full chat of each negotiation.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: leaked negotiation chats · updated on 18 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Conti · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

U.S. Treasury sanctions (OFAC)

OFAC press releases that sanction people or companies and tie them to this group in the text itself.

According to OFAC, facilitating a ransom payment to sanctioned people or companies may violate U.S. sanctions. OFAC advisory. Not legal advice.

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