Ransomware

cuba

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About the group

The Cuba Ransomware, also known as Colddraw Ransomware, was first identified in the threat landscape in 2019 and built a relatively small but selected list of victims. The group is also known as Fidel Ransomware, due to a characteristic marker placed at the beginning of all encrypted files. This file marker is used as an indicator for the ransomware and its decoder that the file has been encrypted.<br> <br> Despite its name and the Cuban nationalist style on its leak site, it is difficult to assert any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba. The group has been linked to a Russian-language threat actor by Profero researchers due to some details of incorrect translation they discovered, as well as the discovery of a 404 page containing text in Russian on the threat actor's own leak site.<br> <br> According to BlackBerry, based on the analysis of the code strings used in the campaign analyzed in 2023, there were indications that the developer behind the Cuba ransomware speaks Russian.<br> <br> The ransomware operators use a double extortion approach, and following the USA, in August 2022, it was believed that the Cuba ransomware group had compromised 101 entities, demandi

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Cobalt StrikeMeterpreter
Credential theft
Mimikatz
Defense evasion
Avast Anti-Rootkit driver
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
PsExec
Remote access (RMM)
NetSupport
Tunneling and networking
Termite

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts: Operators leveraged valid local accounts for initial access.
    • T1133 External Remote Services: Cuba ransomware operators used external remote services for initial access. Operators utilized external remote services to move laterally within the network.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: Cuba ransomware operators executed PowerShell commands during the attack.
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: The Windows Command Shell was used to execute various commands during the attack.
    • T1106 Native API: Cuba ransomware used native API calls to execute malicious behaviors.
    • T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File: Malicious files were used to trick users into executing ransomware.
    • T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution: Cuba ransomware was executed using Windows system services.
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation: Cuba ransomware exploited vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location: The ransomware used legitimate names or locations to evade detection.
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1021.002 Remote Services: External Remote Services: Remote services were used to gain access to systems during the attack.
    • T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access: Cuba ransomware operators exploited vulnerabilities to gain credential access.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1016.001 Network Configuration Discovery: Network Connection Enumeration: Network connections were enumerated for discovery purposes.
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: Remote systems were discovered using built-in utilities.
    • T1057 Process Discovery: Running processes were identified during the attack.
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Files and directories were enumerated during the attack.
    • T1124 Time Discovery: Cuba ransomware operators performed time discovery on infected systems.
    • T1135 Network Share Discovery: Network shares were enumerated by the ransomware.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1570 Tool Transfer: Cuba ransomware operators used tool transfer for lateral movement.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: Web protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS were used for communication.
    • T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS: DNS was used as a protocol for command and control communication.
    • T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy: Cuba ransomware operators used multi-hop proxies to obfuscate communication.
    • T1219 Remote Desktop Protocol: The operators used Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for command and control.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 03 Feb 2021 to 01 Feb 2024

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

2 known site(s): 0 online, 2 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 1

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

cuba.txt · 4 contact(s) masked
Good day. All your files are encrypted. For decryption contact us.
Write here [email]
reserve [email]
jabber [email]
We also inform that your databases, ftp server and file server were downloaded by us to our servers.
If we do not receive a message from you within three days, we regard this as a refusal to negotiate.
Check our platform: [.onion address]
* Do not rename encrypted files.
* Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software,
it may cause permanent data loss.
* Do not stop process of encryption, because partial encryption cannot be decrypted.
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 4

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

3 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

cuba.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Cuba · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

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