RansomwareTargets Brazil

everest

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Everest ransom group collects and analyzes information about their victims. They specialize in customer privacy data, financial information, databases, credit card information, and more. The Everest ransom group leaks the victim's data to the darknet and they announced that any victim that will not contact them will suffer from a data leak and they will not delete hist files for future usage.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Cobalt StrikeMetasploitMeterpreter
Credential theft
ProcDump
Discovery
SoftPerfect NetScan
Remote access (RMM)
AnyDeskAteraSplashtop

How the group attacks

  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary protected with ConfuserEx: rename obfuscation, constants encryption, integer confusion, and modified module .cctor.
    • T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution: All non-corlib native API calls resolved at runtime via LoadLibrary / GetProcAddress rather than static imports.
    • T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts: Implicit current-user impersonation used for net use \\<unc> connections to discovered network shares without explicit credential passing.
    • T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information: Runtime decryption of UserStrings via <Module>.m using GZip decompression followed by Base64 decoding.
    • T1480 Execution Guardrails: Global <GUID> mutex enforces single-instance execution; CIS culture/LCID geo-fence prevents execution on CIS-locale systems.
    • T1564 Hide Artifacts: Process self-DACL set to deny-Everyone via KZsyzkgZlDQw.UB, preventing other processes from inspecting or terminating the ransomware process.
    • T1622 Debugger Evasion: Memory-pig killer heuristic: processes consuming more than 250 MB are terminated, targeting sandbox environments and active debuggers.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: ARP table parsed via arp -a; ARP-driven Wake-On-LAN packets sent to discovered hosts to bring them online before encryption.
    • T1135 Network Share Discovery: Network shares enumerated via net view, NetDfsEnum, WNetEnumResource*, Win32_Share WMI class, and Win32_NetworkConnection.
    • T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery: Anti-analysis kill list matched against ProcessName and MainWindowTitle to identify and terminate security/analysis tools.
    • T1614.001 System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery: CIS culture/LCID check used as exclusion geo-fence; execution aborts if system locale matches CIS-region languages.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares: net.exe use \\<unc> executed over discovered SMB shares to access and encrypt remote file systems.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: WebClient.DownloadData referenced in Helpers.DownloadUrl — present in code but not reachable at runtime (inert code path).
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: AES-128-CBC PKCS#7 / NoPadding (large files) encryption of all eligible files on local drives, mounted unlettered volumes, and LAN shares.
    • T1489 Service Stop: ServiceController.Stop called against ~100 services (AV, backup, MSSQL, Exchange, MBAM, Veeam, Acronis, etc.) combined with sc config <svc> start=disabled to prevent restart.
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: VSS deletion via PowerShell or vssadmin, SRRemoveRestorePoint, backup file deletion (del /s /q), Recycle Bin removal (rd /s /q), Restart Manager used to force-shutdown apps locking target files.
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1112 Modify Registry: Multiple HKCU/HKLM registry writes: LongPathsEnabled, LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy, EnableLinkedConnections (share access), WallPaper (ransom note), AppName\PublicKey (encryption key storage).

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 09 Sep 2021 to 14 Nov 2026

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

8 known site(s): 1 online, 7 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteonlineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Filesofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Filesofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Filesofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Filesofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Filesofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 1

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

EVERESTRANSOMWARE.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
Dear [snip],
Greetings from the Everest team. Your systems have been attacked, the files are encrypted. You can read about us in our blog (Tor browser needed)
Blog : [.onion address]
Or read about our group in Twitter
Also, our team was able to bypass your "Dataprotection" as any other your protection software and more than 1 Terabyte of internal files were exfiltrated to our servers, which we can confirm with great joy and ease
The list contains financial documents, internal orders, KYC information(documents,photos...), trusted representatives personal info
Client risk levels,loans, debt and client data. Various financial documentation, backups , etc. etc.
The information was collected both from personal PCs and from centralized storage locations.
If an agreement is reached with us, this information will never be published and the problem will disappear as if it never happened, otherwise it will be posted on our blog and darknet. Which will lead to even greater financial and reputational losses on your part.
Also you will get 
1.Attack logbook (months of experience with your company) with full list of vulnerabilities and bypass methods
2.Advices how to singifically improve your security and avoid such attacks in the future
3.We will delete all files from your company
4.We will attack your company no more
Yours trully Everest Team
Email to contact: [email]
Your key: 
[snip]
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 10

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

Indicators (IOCs)
SHA-256 1
  • 1df92bf4c967297d8a39fc3f619a56702ee96d5cf9196b8e1d5b3654746c6514
IP 3
  • 18.193.71.144
  • 3.22.79.23
  • 45.84.0.164
Mutex 1
  • Global\7efc73f7-fda1-42d1-a4c5-8f1670bd08a5

4 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

everest.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Everest · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

Impact and victims

The group everest has 6 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

6known victims
2in Brazil
3sectors hit
Activity (12 months)
03
05
07
09
Most attacked sectors
Energy & Utilities4
Financial Services1
Technology1
Most affected countries
🇧🇷 Brazil2
🇨🇴 Colombia2
🇵🇦 Panama1
🇵🇪 Peru1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planTechnology · PE · 2026-09-01
Name on the SOC planEnergy & Utilities · CO · 2026-07-06
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · CO · 2026-05-29
Name on the SOC planEnergy & Utilities · PA · 2026-03-31
Name on the SOC planEnergy & Utilities · BR · 2025-11-17
Name on the SOC planEnergy & Utilities · BR · 2025-11-17

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

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