RansomwareTargets BrazilG1050

Qilin

Also known as: GOLD FEATHER, Water Galura

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Water Galura are the operators of the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) who handle payload generation, ransom negotiations, and the publication of stolen data for Qilin affilates recruited on Russian cybercrime forums. Water Galura have been active since at least 2022 and use a double extortion model where they demand payment for providing decryption keys and for refraining from publishing the stolen data to their leak site.

Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 3

How the group operates, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and organized by the phases of an attack.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Cobalt StrikeEvilginxKali LinuxNetExecSystemBCTofsee
Credential theft
Mimikatz
Discovery
NmapNping
Defense evasion
EDRSandBlastPCHunterPowerToolToshiba power management driver (BYOVD)Updater for Carbon Black’s Cloud Sensor AV (upd.exe)YDArkZemana Anti-Rootkit driver
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
PowerShellPsExecWinRMfsutil
Remote access (RMM)
NetSupportScreenConnect
Tunneling and networking
Proxychains
Exfiltration
EasyUpload.ioMEGA

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: Compromised credentials used to authenticate via VPN and RDP. Qilin notably steals credentials from Chrome browsers on compromised endpoints before encryption.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in VPN appliances and remote management tools to gain initial access.
    • T1566 Phishing
    • T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service: Qilin affiliates spear-phished MSP administrators via ScreenConnect to gain access to downstream customers. Phishing campaigns using credential-harvesting pages targeting VPN and SSO portals.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: PowerShell scripts used for payload execution, lateral movement, and post-exploitation tasks.
    • T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell: Shell scripts used to execute the Linux/ESXi variant of the Qilin ransomware payload.
    • T1106 Native API: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1129 Shared Modules: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1569 System Services
    • T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
    • T1574 Hijack Execution Flow: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
    • T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
    • T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task: Scheduled tasks created to maintain persistence and execute post-exploitation scripts.
    • T1098.004 Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
    • T1136 Create Account
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1055 Process Injection: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information: Qilin.B variant (October 2024) introduced enhanced obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques compared to earlier versions.
    • T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature
    • T1055 Process Injection: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1070 Indicator Removal: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1134.004 Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing
    • T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion
    • T1480 Execution Guardrails
    • T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
    • T1564 Hidden Artifacts
    • T1564.003 Hidden Artifacts: Hidden Window
    • T1574 Hijack Execution Flow: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: LSASS memory dumped to harvest credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
    • T1040 Network Sniffing
    • T1056 Input Capture: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1110.002 Brute Force: Password Cracking
    • T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers: Qilin notably deployed a custom script to steal credentials stored in Google Chrome browsers on all domain-joined machines via Group Policy — a distinctive TTP first observed in the Synnovis NHS attack (June 2024).
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1012 Query Registry
    • T1046 Network Service Discovery: Network scanning used to enumerate hosts and services within the victim environment.
    • T1082 System Information Discovery: System information collected to tailor the attack and identify high-value targets.
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1135 Network Share Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1518 Software Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1614 System Location Discovery
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021 Remote Services
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: RDP used for lateral movement across victim networks.
    • T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares: SMB used to propagate payloads and move laterally within the network.
    • T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
  • Collection TA0009
    • T1056 Input Capture: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: Data compressed and archived prior to exfiltration.
    • T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
    • T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
    • T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Data exfiltrated to cloud storage and actor-controlled servers for double extortion via the Qilin leak site.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1001 Data Obfuscation
    • T1001.001 Data Obfuscation: Junk Data
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: C2 communication over HTTPS; Tor used for victim portals.
    • T1090 Proxy: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1572 Protocol Tunneling
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Qilin (formerly Agenda) uses ChaCha20 for file encryption with RSA-4096 for key protection. Originally written in Go, later rewritten in Rust (Qilin.B). Targets Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi. Notable attack: Synnovis NHS pathology services (June 2024) causing 10,000+ NHS appointment cancellations. Active RaaS with high affiliate revenue share.
    • T1489 Service Stop: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Shadow copies deleted; ESXi snapshots removed to prevent VM recovery.
    • T1561 Disk Wipe
    • T1561.001 Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe
  • Resource Development TA0042
  • Reconnaissance TA0043
    • T1590.004 Gather Victim Network Information: Network Topology
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Security tools and EDR solutions disabled via batch scripts and Group Policy modifications.
    • T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 08 Oct 2022 to 15 Nov 2026

Exploited vulnerabilities 17

CVEs this group is known to exploit, with the source and confidence of each next to it. Ordered by confidence and real-world severity.

The group's sites

4 known site(s): 1 online, 3 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteonline16 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Adminofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 3

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

DtMXQFOCos-RECOVER-README.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
-- Agenda

Your network/system was encrypted.
Encrypted files have new extension.

-- Compromising and sensitive data

We have downloaded compromising and sensitive data from you system/network
If you refuse to communicate with us and we do not come to an agreementyour data will be published.
Data includes:
 - Employees personal dataCVsDLSSN.
 - Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services.
 - Financial information including clients databillsbudgetsannual reportsbank statements.
 - Complete datagrams/schemas/drawings for manufacturing in solidworks format
 - And more...

-- Warning

1) If you modify files - our decrypt software won't able to recover data
2) If you use third party software - you can damage/modify files (see item 1)
3) You need cipher key / our decrypt software to restore you files.
4) The police or authorities will not be able to help you get the cipher key. We encourage you to consider your decisions.

-- Recovery

1) Download tor browser: [link]
2) Go to domain
3) Enter credentials


-- Credentials

Extension: DtMXQFOCos
Domain: [.onion address]
login: [snip] 
password: [snip]
README-RECOVER-[rand].txt · 1 contact(s) masked
-- Qilin 



Your network/system was encrypted. 

Encrypted files have new extension. 



-- Compromising and sensitive data 



We have downloaded compromising and sensitive data from you system/network 

If you refuse to communicate with us and we do not come to an agreement, your data will be published. 

Data includes: 

- Employees personal data, CVs, DL , SSN. 

- Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services. 

- Financial information including clients data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements. 

- Complete datagrams/schemas/drawings for manufacturing in solidworks format 

- And more... 



-- Warning 



1) If you modify files - our decrypt software won't able to recover data 

2) If you use third party software - you can damage/modify files (see item 1) 

3) You need cipher key / our decrypt software to restore you files. 

4) The police or authorities will not be able to help you get the cipher key. We encourage you to consider your decisions. 



-- Recovery 



1) Download tor browser: [link] 

2) Go to domain 

3) Enter credentials-- Credentials 

Extension: [snip] 
Domain: [.onion address] 
login: [snip] 
password:[snip]
README-RECOVER-[rand]_2.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
-- Qilin 



We have 3.4TB of your data stored on our servers. Contact us or we will publish this data on our blog, in the media and pass it on to the relevant authorities. We are ready to offer you a discount in case of payment within a week.



Your network/system was encrypted. 

Encrypted files have new extension. 



-- Compromising and sensitive data 



We have downloaded compromising and sensitive data from your system/network.

Our group cooperates with the mass media.

If you refuse to communicate with us and we do not come to an agreement, your data will be reviewed and published on our blog and on the media page ([link]



Blog links:

[.onion address]

[.onion address]



Data includes: 

- Employees personal data, CVs, DL , SSN. 

- Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services. 

- Financial information including clients data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements. 

- Complete datagrams/schemas/drawings for manufacturing in solidworks format 

- And more... 



-- Warning 



1) If you modify files - our decrypt software won't able to recover data 

2) If you use third party software - you can damage/modify files (see item 1) 

3) You need cipher key / our decrypt software to restore you files. 

4) The police or authorities will not be able to help you get the cipher key. We encourage you to consider your decisions. 



-- Recovery 



1) Download tor browser: [link] 

2) Go to domain 

3) Enter credentials



Please note that communication with us is only possible via the website in the Tor browser, which is specified in this note. 

All other means of communication are not real and may be created by third parties, if such were not provided in this note or on the website specified in this note.

-- Credentials 

Extension: 2ir53sQQAU 
Domain: [snip] 
login: [snip] 
password:[snip]
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 66

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

Indicators (IOCs)
SHA-256 1
  • 37546b811e369547c8bd631fa4399730d3bdaff635e744d83632b74f44f56cf6
MD5 54
  • 08a2405cd32f044a69737e77454ee2da
  • 0d68a310f4265821900249bec89364c2
  • 11d795baafa44b73766e850d13b8e254
  • 144183a4217ae0914ba0c865858d07cd
  • 19ff6488a259d750ec18902fe75a713b
  • 1bde76f3197123dcc2ecd0bfef567484
  • 1c4bea81c0da22badd9b7eab574c51cd
  • 2020979e080d7ac9c0403172573c7de8

and 46 more: see them all in the IOC search

IP 7
  • 176.113.115.209
  • 176.113.115.97
  • 185.196.10.52
  • 188.119.66.189
  • 31.41.244.100
  • 64.176.162.76
  • 85.209.11.49

3 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

Qilin.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Negotiation 3

What the leaked negotiation chats show about the group: how much it asks at first, how much it accepts and how often a payment happened.

3
Leaked chats
—
Initial demand (median)
in 2 chat(s)
—
Negotiated amount (median)
in 1 chat(s)
—
Discount (median)
in 1 chat(s)
0%
Payment happened
0 of 3
36
Messages per chat (median)

The sample is only the chats that leaked, not every attack by the group. Amounts are as the group wrote them; the medians use only the dollar amounts.

DateDemandNegotiatedPaidMessages
03 Feb 2025$63,000N/Ano36
29 Apr 2024N/AN/Ano3
—$63,000$60,000no36
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you read the full chat of each negotiation.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: leaked negotiation chats · updated on 18 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Qilin · uses the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: MITRE ATT&CK

Impact and victims

The group Qilin has 181 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

181known victims
16in Brazil
8sectors hit
Activity (12 months)
11
12
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
Most attacked sectors
Manufacturing30
Agriculture and Food Production21
Professional Services20
Retail & E-Commerce19
Technology15
Healthcare14
Other13
Financial Services10
Most affected countries
🇲🇽 Mexico52
🇦🇷 Argentina40
🇨🇱 Chile23
🇨🇴 Colombia19
🇧🇷 Brazil16
🇵🇪 Peru14
🇪🇨 Ecuador4
🇻🇪 Venezuela3
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · PE · 2026-11-16
Name on the SOC planHealthcare · BR · 2026-11-07
Name on the SOC planNot Found · MX · 2026-11-07
Name on the SOC planHealthcare · CL · 2026-11-02
Name on the SOC planHealthcare · MX · 2026-10-30
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · MX · 2026-10-30
Name on the SOC planOther · MX · 2026-10-30
Name on the SOC planTechnology · MX · 2026-10-30
Name on the SOC planTechnology · AR · 2026-10-23
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · AR · 2026-10-23
Name on the SOC planOther · MX · 2026-10-23
Name on the SOC planTransportation · CL · 2026-10-23
Name on the SOC planNot Found · MX · 2026-10-22
Name on the SOC planOther · AR · 2026-10-19
Name on the SOC planNot Found · MX · 2026-10-19

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

Known infrastructure 66

Real indicators (C2, domains, URLs and hashes) associated with the malware this group uses. Source: community indicator feeds.

md5_hash964c13b68dc6b6b918b66a9a10469d2aqilingroup leak site
md5_hashd1c331c17ddd4abe0d53755461c1ec9aqilingroup leak site
md5_hash88bb86494cb9411a9692f9c8e67ed32cqilingroup leak site
md5_hashe01776ec67b9f1ae780c3e24ecc4bf06qilingroup leak site
md5_hash64a590760fdbb84356544cc90ac3d50fqilingroup leak site
md5_hash2020979e080d7ac9c0403172573c7de8qilingroup leak site
md5_hashd309e3d77ed6a336eb3ad263ddf9db90qilingroup leak site
md5_hash575b26c1cc06609722f98e2beaed6a8aqilingroup leak site
md5_hash1bde76f3197123dcc2ecd0bfef567484qilingroup leak site
md5_hashea1f8794c73b26724314e5356f1f4128qilingroup leak site
md5_hash996c394d0f6d6967df9542c52f6f4661qilingroup leak site
md5_hash348b0ce6af4698061678c8e92b4b2675qilingroup leak site
md5_hashb4a6152514919a637c22a58bea316fc7qilingroup leak site
ip188.119.66.189qilingroup leak site
ip185.196.10.52qilingroup leak site
md5_hashb04e8ee43aba85fa5c585b9335c953c2qilingroup leak site
md5_hash59d756280b06cf113ca43abc0050edd5qilingroup leak site
md5_hashdd42c3e017889c107a81da78d87dc8afqilingroup leak site
md5_hashbed0f34673cc93560c17e3ab04ea5d19qilingroup leak site
md5_hash4a3f22021e4415e8211633fb3735a046qilingroup leak site
md5_hash5cffa3126b9effc279d32b2cf4ef2278qilingroup leak site
md5_hash144183a4217ae0914ba0c865858d07cdqilingroup leak site
md5_hashf588802958c35fe18eb87bc36651a3d1qilingroup leak site
md5_hash2bb209ccfc5103eccab523c875050cfaqilingroup leak site
md5_hash8ca5c9745e8a0e18167a9b932821645aqilingroup leak site
md5_hash11d795baafa44b73766e850d13b8e254qilingroup leak site
md5_hash88630916b0c6633ca28c8896416a93eeqilingroup leak site
md5_hash9f510626c7327a7c2328bc5131726638qilingroup leak site
md5_hash9ea321b6a0f069caab7092cfe1cbbde0qilingroup leak site
ip176.113.115.97qilingroup leak site

+66 indicators in total. See them all on the IOCs page.

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