qlocker
E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.
About the group
QLocker was a financially motivated ransomware operation active in 2021 that exclusively targeted QNAP NAS devices exposed to the internet, exploiting a hard-coded credentials vulnerability to compress files into password-protected 7-Zip archives and demanding roughly $400 per victim, netting approximately $350,000 in a single month.
Exploited vulnerabilities
No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.
The group's sites
1 known site(s): 0 online, 1 offline, 0 seized.
| Type | Status | Changed on | Address |
|---|---|---|---|
| negotiation (chat) | offline | seen since 12 Nov 2026 | •••••••• (on the SOC plan) |
With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.
These plans deliver the raw intelligence:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansSource: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026
Ransom notes 1
The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.
Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"
!!!READ_ME.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
!!! All your files have been encrypted !!! All your files were encrypted using a private and unique key generated for the computer. This key is stored in our server and the only way to receive your key and decrypt your files is making a Bitcoin payment. To purchase your key and decrypt your files, please follow these steps: 1. Dowload the Tor Browser at "[link]". If you need help, please Google for "access onion page". 2. Visit the following pages with the Tor Browser: [.onion address] 3. Enter your Client Key: [snip]
With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.
These plans deliver the raw intelligence:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansSource: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026
Detection 1
The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.
qlocker.yar
With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.
These plans deliver the raw intelligence:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansDefensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026
Ransomware families
The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.
- Qlocker · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday
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