RansomwareTargets Brazil

royal

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

According to Trendmicro, Royal ransomware was first observed in September 2022, and the threat actors behind it are believed to be seasoned cybercriminals who used to be part of Conti Team One.

Similar names and other brands

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
Brute Ratel C4Cobalt Strike
Credential theft
MimikatzNirSoft DialupassNirSoft IEPassView (iepv)NirSoft MailPassViewNirSoft NetpassNirSoft RouterPassView
Discovery
AdFindAdvanced IP ScannerSharpSharesSoftPerfect NetScan
Defense evasion
EraserGMERNSudoPowerTool
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
PsExec
Remote access (RMM)
AnyDeskAteraLogMeInMobaXtermSyncro
Tunneling and networking
ChiselCloudflaredOpenSSH
Exfiltration
RClone

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment: A spearphishing email was sent to employees.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: Cobalt Strike was executed through encoded PowerShell commands.
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: Qbot was launched through the Windows Command Shell with cmd.exe.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Cobalt Strike was installed as a Windows service on multiple systems.
    • T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder: Qbot DLL was added to HKCUEY_CURRENT_USER \Software \Microsoft \Windows \CurrentVersion \Run.
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1078.002 Domain Accounts: Royal ransomware operators used (privileged) domain accounts for lateral movement.
    • T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control: Royal ransomware operations executed a known UAC bypass that abuses a default scheduled task to launch PowerShell with escalated privileges.
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027.006 Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling: Password protected file containing an ISO file with a hidden file used in combination with an LNK file to execute Qbot.
    • T1055 Process Injection: Qbot and Cobalt Strike were both injected into legitimate Windows processes.
    • T1078.002 Domain Accounts: Royal ransomware operators used domain accounts for lateral movement.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account: The FindLocalAdmin PowerSploit script was used to find local administrator accounts on workstations/servers.
    • T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: Users and groups were enumerated with built-in Windows utilities and with AdFind software.
    • T1135 Network Share Discovery: Network shares were enumerated with PowerSploit software.
    • T1482 Domain Trust Discovery: Domain trust was enumerated with built-in Windows utilities.
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares: Remote admin shares C$ were mounted from the Patient 0 workstation.
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Several (privileged) domain accounts were used during the attack for lateral movement and deployment of ransomware.
    • T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash: The Royal ransomware operators leveraged credential hashes from privileged accounts to perform lateral movement.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Royal ransomware operators used Mega Cloud Storage and Dropbox to exfiltrate data from multiple hosts.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071 Application Layer Protocol: Cobalt Strike uses peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol.
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: Qbot and Cobalt Strike used HTTPS traffic for their C2 communication.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Royal ransomware encrypted files on systems with the .royal extension.

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 04 Nov 2022 to 19 Jul 2023

Exploited vulnerabilities

No CVEs attributed to this group in public sources (MITRE ATT&CK). Absence of attribution does not mean absence of activity.

The group's sites

2 known site(s): 0 online, 2 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
negotiation (chat)offlineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 1

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

royal.txt · 1 contact(s) masked
Hello!

 If you are reading this, it means that your system were hit by Royal ransomware.
 Please contact us via :
 [.onion address]

In the meantime, let us explain this case.It may seem complicated, but it is not!
Most likely what happened was that you decided to save some money on your security infrastructure.
Alas, as a result your critical data was not only encrypted but also copied from your systems on a secure server.
From there it can be published online.Then anyone on the internet from darknet criminals, ACLU journalists, Chinese government(different names for the same thing),
and even your employees will be able to see your internal documentation: personal data, HR reviews, internal lawsuitsand complains, financial reports, accounting, intellectual property, and more!

 Fortunately we got you covered!

Royal offers you a unique deal.For a modest royalty(got it; got it ? ) for our pentesting services we will not only provide you with an amazing risk mitigation service,
covering you from reputational, legal, financial, regulatory, and insurance risks, but will also provide you with a security review for your systems.
To put it simply, your files will be decrypted, your data restoredand kept confidential, and your systems will remain secure.

 Try Royal today and enter the new era of data security!
 We are looking to hearing from you soon!
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 1

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

royal.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Royal · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

Impact and victims

The group royal has 7 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

7known victims
4in Brazil
5sectors hit
Most attacked sectors
Professional Services2
Retail & E-Commerce2
Energy & Utilities1
Manufacturing1
Technology1
Most affected countries
🇧🇷 Brazil4
🇲🇽 Mexico2
🇻🇪 Venezuela1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planRetail & E-Commerce · VE · 2023-03-02
Name on the SOC planManufacturing · BR · 2023-02-20
Name on the SOC planRetail & E-Commerce · MX · 2023-02-02
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · BR · 2022-12-27
Name on the SOC planTechnology · MX · 2022-12-25
Name on the SOC planEnergy & Utilities · BR · 2022-12-23
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · BR · 2022-12-23

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

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