Capsule vulnerable to privilege escalation by ServiceAccount deployed in a Tenant Namespace
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 8.8epss 0.9%
exploitation probability
0.9%top 45% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. Prior to version 0.1.3, a ServiceAccount deployed in a Tenant Namespace, when granted with `PATCH` capabilities on its own Namespace, is able to edit it and remove the Owner Reference, breaking the reconciliation of the Capsule Operator and removing all the enforcement like Pod Security annotations, Network Policies, Limit Range and Resource Quota items. An attacker could detach the Namespace from a Tenant that is forbidding starting privileged Pods using the Pod Security labels by removing the OwnerReference, removing the enforcement labels, and being able to start privileged containers that would be able to start a generic Kubernetes privilege escalation. Patches have been released for version 0.1.3. No known workarounds are available.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
clastix · capsuleReferences
https://github.com/clastix/capsule/commit/1df430e71be8c4778c82eca3459978ad7d0b4b7bhttps://github.com/clastix/capsule/commit/75525ac19254b0c5111e34d7985e2be7bc8b1ac1https://github.com/clastix/capsule/releases/tag/v0.1.3https://github.com/clastix/capsule/security/advisories/GHSA-x45c-cvp8-q4fm