CVE-2026-100671highCWE-200

CVE-2026-100671: high-severity vulnerability in getgrav grav

Grav before 2.0.25 Session Cookie Theft via Twig Sandbox

Published · Updated

E-mail alert when it lands in KEV, gets a public PoC or its score goes up.

41Vexday Risk Score

No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.

ssvc Attendcvss 8.6epss 0.4%
from disclosure to weapon5 days
Published on NVDSep 26
1st PoC+5d
Grav is a flat-file CMS. In versions 2.0.19 through 2.0.24 — and in 2.0.0 through 2.0.18 and 1.7.x only where content Twig has been explicitly enabled — page content authored by a user holding only page-write permission is rendered through a Twig sandbox that allowlists get_cookie(), which returns any cookie sent with the current request, including the visitor's session cookie. Because the read occurs server-side via filter_input(INPUT_COOKIE, ...), the HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite attributes offer no protection. Grav then stores the finished post-Twig output in a page-content cache keyed only on page identity and the configuration checksum, with no session, user or request dimension and no bypass for authenticated visitors. A page published by a page-write user can therefore capture the session identifier of the next administrator who views it, after which the cached output serves that identifier to unauthenticated visitors, who can replay the cookie to authenticate as that administrator. Since 2.0.19, security.twig_content.process_enabled defaults to true and Security::applyTwigContentDefault() derives each page's process.twig flag from that gate, so content Twig runs on every page with no frontmatter or operator action. Fixed in 2.0.25; 1.7.x is outside the backport scope.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
getgrav · grav
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