Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects
13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 5.5epss 0.1%
exploitation probability
0.1%top 98% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Affected products
MoonshotAI · Kimi Code