Langflow is vulnerable to arbitrary local file read due to path traversal in ChatInput, bundle FileInput, and GitExtractor components
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.7epss 0.4%
exploitation probability
0.4%top 66% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem — including server secret material (secret_key, JWT signing keys, the application database, /proc/self/environ, and other tenants' upload directories) — by supplying absolute paths or traversal sequences in the files parameter of an authenticated build request. The file contents were embedded as text attachments in the language model prompt and transmitted to the configured model endpoint, resulting in confidential data exfiltration. This bypassed the LANGFLOW_RESTRICT_LOCAL_FILE_ACCESS=true containment boundary, which was enforced for other file-reading components but not for the Chat Input to Message attachment pipeline.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Affected products
IBM · Langflow OSS