Zed Extension Sandbox Escape via Tar Symlink Following
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 8.8epss 0.5%
exploitation probability
0.5%top 59% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Zed, a code editor, has an extension installer allows tar/gzip downloads. Prior to version 0.224.4, the tar extractor (`async_tar::Archive::unpack`) creates symlinks from the archive without validation, and the path guard (`writeable_path_from_extension`) only performs lexical prefix checks without resolving symlinks. An attacker can ship a tar that first creates a symlink inside the extension workdir pointing outside (e.g., `escape -> /`), then writes files through the symlink, causing writes to arbitrary host paths. This escapes the extension sandbox and enables code execution. Version 0.224.4 patches the issue.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
zed-industries · zed