Improper key_share validation in TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest
8Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 1.2epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 89% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Missing required cryptographic step in the TLS 1.3 client HelloRetryRequest handshake logic in wolfSSL could lead to a compromise in the confidentiality of TLS-protected communications via a crafted HelloRetryRequest followed by a ServerHello message that omits the required key_share extension, resulting in derivation of predictable traffic secrets from (EC)DHE shared secret. This issue does not affect the client's authentication of the server during TLS handshakes.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/AU:Y/R:A/V:D/U:Clear
Affected products
wolfSSL · wolfSSL