TypeBot: SSRF Protection Bypass via DNS-Resolved Hostnames in Webhook / HTTP Request Validation
41Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 7.6epss 0.2%
from disclosure to weapon35 days
Published on NVDMay 22
1st PoC+35d
exploitation probability
0.2%top 85% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
1 public exploit(s)
TypeBot is a chatbot builder tool. In versions prior to 3.16.0, SSRF protection for Webhook / HTTP Request blocks validates only the URL string, blocked hostname literals, and literal IP formats. It does not resolve DNS before allowing the request. As a result, a hostname such as ssrf-repro.example that resolves to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or RFC1918/private space passes validation and is later fetched by the backend HTTP client. This enables server-side request forgery to loopback, cloud metadata, and private network targets. This issue has been resolved in version 3.16.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Affected products
baptisteArno · typebot.iopublic PoCs found — 1
githubgithub.com/0xmrma/CVE-2026-34207★ 0⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.