vLLM Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Frame Count in video/jpeg Base64 Processing
13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 6.5epss 0.4%
exploitation probability
0.4%top 69% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From 0.7.0 to before 0.19.0, the VideoMediaIO.load_base64() method at vllm/multimodal/media/video.py splits video/jpeg data URLs by comma to extract individual JPEG frames, but does not enforce a frame count limit. The num_frames parameter (default: 32), which is enforced by the load_bytes() code path, is completely bypassed in the video/jpeg base64 path. An attacker can send a single API request containing thousands of comma-separated base64-encoded JPEG frames, causing the server to decode all frames into memory and crash with OOM. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Affected products
vllm-project · vllmReferences
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36005https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36006https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34755https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2455403https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7phttps://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-34755.json