CVE-2026-41583: critical vulnerability in ZcashFoundation zebra
ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling
Published
28Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 9.3epss 0.5%
exploitation probability
0.5%top 61% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H
Affected products
ZcashFoundation · zebraRelated CVEs — ZcashFoundation zebra
In the same product, most dangerous first.
CVE-2026-34202CRITICALZebra node crash — V5 transaction hash panic (P2P reachable)EPSS 0.9%CVE-2026-52736HIGHZEBRA: Block suppression via NU5 same-header body poisoning of sent-hash cacheEPSS 0.6%CVE-2026-52829HIGHZEBRA: IPv4-Mapped Mempool Misbehavior Update Aborts Zebra Address BookEPSS 0.6%CVE-2026-44499HIGHZEBRA: Permanent Block Discovery Halt via Gossip Queue Saturation and Syncer PoisoningEPSS 0.5%CVE-2026-52731MEDIUMZEBRA: Full node denial of service via non-ASCII LongPollId in getblocktemplateEPSS 0.5%CVE-2026-52739MEDIUMZEBRA: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier RejectionEPSS 0.5%