Roxy-WI: Authorization bypass on POST /smon/agent/action/<action> — guest can stop or restart smon-agent on any host
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 8.5epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 90% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, agent_action (app/routes/smon/agent_routes.py:166-179) has decorators @bp.post('/agent/action/<action>') and @jwt_required() only — no role check, no group ownership check on the server_ip form field. Any authenticated user, including role 4 (guest), can start, stop, or restart the roxy-wi-smon-agent systemd unit on any server they can name. Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H
Affected products
roxy-wi · roxy-wi