luci-app-https-dns-proxy Authenticated Command Injection via setInitAction
41Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 8.7epss 6.6%
from disclosure to weapon0 days
Published on NVDMay 26
1st PoCJan 16
exploitation probability
6.6%top 7% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
2 public exploit(s)
luci-app-https-dns-proxy through 2025.12.29-5 — an optional LuCI web UI add-on for the https-dns-proxy package, distributed through the OpenWrt community packages feed and not installed by default — contains a command injection vulnerability in the setInitAction function. An authenticated user holding the luci.https-dns-proxy ACL permission can inject shell metacharacters through the 'name' parameter of a ubus RPC call to luci.https-dns-proxy setInitAction, resulting in arbitrary command execution as root on the underlying device. Core OpenWrt is not affected; only installations that have opted in to the luci-app-https-dns-proxy package are vulnerable.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
mossdef-org · luci-app-https-dns-proxypublic PoCs found — 2
cve_referencewww.exploit-db.com/exploits/52521unverifiedgithubgithub.com/iwallplace/CVE-2026-46368-OpenWrt-Exploit★ 1⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.