CVE-2026-46512: critical vulnerability in mwtcmi frogman
Frogman: Dialplan template parameters interpolated into extensions_custom.conf without escaping
Published · Updated
E-mail alert when it lands in KEV, gets a public PoC or its score goes up.
28Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 9.9epss 0.7%
Frogman provides headless PBX control through MCP and HTTP API. Prior to 1.6.2, fm_dialplan_apply accepted template parameters including greeting, dest, url, extension, code, and file, and Tools/DialplanApply.php wrote Dialplan/Templates.php output to extensions_custom.conf while only Dialplan/TemplateBase.php:38-42 sanitized contextName(), allowing a PERM_WRITE caller using confirm:true to inject arbitrary Asterisk directives such as System(), Set(SHELL(...)), Goto, or Macro. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
mwtcmi · frogmanRelated CVEs — mwtcmi frogman
In the same product, most dangerous first.
CVE-2026-46515CRITICALFrogman: Multiple read-tier tools expose admin-grade data and arbitrary GraphQL executionEPSS 0.6%CVE-2026-46514MEDIUMFrogman: Plaintext passwords and secrets persisted to audit logEPSS 0.5%CVE-2026-46516MEDIUMFrogman vulnerable to stored XSS in chat console formatter (escalation vector in multi-admin deployments)EPSS 0.4%CVE-2026-46513HIGHFrogman: API tokens stored in plaintextEPSS 0.4%