Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.
28Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 9.5epss 0.3%
exploitation probability
0.3%top 75% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Affected products
duck-organization · quest-bot