Cosmos: Authentication bypass via forward-auth header smuggling on Constellation tunnel in Cosmos-Server
13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 6.1epss 0.3%
exploitation probability
0.3%top 79% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Cosmos provides users the ability self-host a home server by acting as a secure gateway to your application, as well as a server manager. Prior to 0.22.19, tokenMiddleware in src/proxy/routerGen.go can return through the Constellation tunnel bypass before removing x-cosmos-user, x-cosmos-role, x-cosmos-user-role, and x-cosmos-mfa headers and before invoking AdminOnlyWithRedirect. An attacker with a valid x-cstln-auth API key for an enrolled device who reaches Cosmos through the Constellation Nebula tunnel can supply a chosen x-cosmos-user value to a route with AuthEnabled enabled when the upstream application trusts that forward-auth header. The request can bypass Cosmos JWT, password, MFA, and AdminOnly checks, allowing user impersonation and admin-tier reads or writes exposed by the proxied application. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.19.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Affected products
azukaar · Cosmos-Server