BabelDOC: Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.8epss 0.1%
exploitation probability
0.1%top 97% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
BabelDOC is a document translation tool. Prior to 0.6.3, BabelDOC's vendored PDF parser in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py deserializes untrusted pickle data when CMapDB._load_data() loads CMap files. PDF-controlled Encoding or CMapName values and embedded PostScript usecmap operators can reach this sink after path separators are decoded, while _normalize_cmap_name() removes only a leading slash. Absolute paths or traversal sequences can escape the trusted CMap directories through os.path.join(), select an attacker-writable .pickle.gz file, and cause pickle.loads() to execute arbitrary Python code with the privileges of the BabelDOC process. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.3.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
funstory-ai · BabelDOCReferences
https://github.com/funstory-ai/BabelDOC/blob/main/docs/release-notes/v0.6.3.mdhttps://github.com/funstory-ai/BabelDOC/commit/28f784ca6b437dbba040bfd9c67110373cd0924bhttps://github.com/funstory-ai/BabelDOC/releases/tag/v0.6.3https://github.com/funstory-ai/BabelDOC/security/advisories/GHSA-m8gf-v64p-gfmg