JS Recon: Command injection in PR Branch Checker workflow via untrusted pull request context values
28Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 9.3epss 0.6%
exploitation probability
0.6%top 53% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
JS Recon is a JavaScript enumeration and SAST tool. From 1.2.1-beta.1 until 1.3.1-beta.2, the PR Branch Checker workflow in .github/workflows/pr_checker.yml places github.head_ref and github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name into BRANCH_NAME and SOURCE_REPO and interpolates those untrusted values into a shell gh pr comment command. A remote user who opens a pull request can use shell metacharacters in a branch or fork name to execute commands in the GitHub Actions runner with the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN, which has pull-requests write permission. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1-beta.2.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
shriyanss · js-recon