browse-mcp: Arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state paths
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 8.6epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 91% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
browse-mcp is a Playwright-based headless-browser MCP server for MCP-capable agents. Prior to 0.8.2, browser_download writes a fetched response body to join(save_dir, filename) without validating the caller-controlled save_dir, while browser_save_state and browser_load_state honor a caller-controlled path unchanged. A malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page, can choose an arbitrary save_dir or state path and a URL whose response body becomes attacker-controlled file contents, allowing writes to any path the process can reach, including ~/.bashrc, autostart entries, or cron files, and potentially leading to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback also uses a raw fetch() that bypasses the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
That1Drifter · browse-mcpReferences
https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/blob/v0.8.2/CHANGELOG.md#082---2026-06-13https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/commit/5352a4a56f626254b445bfa07e4bb48c5aad15c1https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/pull/58https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/releases/tag/v0.8.2https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p