ComfyUI: Path traversal in LoadImage via the /prompt API allows arbitrary file existence probing and image exfiltration
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.5epss 0.4%
exploitation probability
0.4%top 65% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, API, and backend with a graph-and-node interface. Prior to 0.28.0, folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath and exists_annotated_filepath join workflow-controlled annotated filenames to a base directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated crafted POST /prompt workflow using LoadImage or sibling nodes to probe arbitrary host paths and exfiltrate image-format files through /view. LoadImage defines a VALIDATE_INPUTS method, which causes the execution engine to skip COMBO (input-directory) validation. Affected nodes include LoadImage, LoadImageMask, LoadImageOutput, LoadAudio, LoadLatent, LoadVideo, and Load3D. This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Affected products
Comfy-Org · ComfyUI