GeoNetwork vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via unsafe Saxon XSLT processor configuration in formatter
50Vexday Risk Score
Prioritize patching. It exploitation observed by VulnCheck.
ssvc Actcvss 9.1epss 1.2%
from disclosure to weapon
Published on NVDSep 3
VulnCheckSep 3
exploitation probability
1.2%top 34% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
yesVulnCheck
GeoNetwork is a catalog application to manage spatially referenced resources. Prior to versions 4.4.12 and 4.2.17, the Saxon XSLT processor used to render formatters is configured without secure processing (`FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING`) and without disabling Java extension functions (`ALLOW_EXTERNAL_FUNCTIONS`). Any stylesheet loaded by GeoNetwork can therefore invoke
`java.lang.Runtime.exec()` or `java.lang.ProcessBuilder` directly, achieving arbitrary command execution as the GeoNetwork process user. A user with sufficient privileges to upload a formatter can deliver a `.xsl` file containing Java extension call that execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the GeoNetwork process. The issue is patched in GeoNetwork versions 4.4.12 and 4.2.17.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
geonetwork · core-geonetworkReferences
https://docs.geonetwork-opensource.org/4.2/overview/change-log/version-4.2.17https://docs.geonetwork-opensource.org/4.4/overview/change-log/version-4.4.12https://github.com/geonetwork/core-geonetwork/security/advisories/GHSA-x898-729x-cc3rhttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/geonetwork-fixes-unauthenticated-rce.html