FlashAttention Symlink Attack via tarfile.extractall in hopper/setup.py
33Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 5.3epss 0.1%
exploitation probability
0.1%top 97% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
1 public exploit(s)
FlashAttention through 2.8.3.post1, fixed in commit 0816ef1, contains a symlink attack vulnerability in the download_and_copy() function within hopper/setup.py that extracts NVIDIA toolchain archives without validating symlinks or filtering tar members. A local attacker can pre-plant a symlink in the predictable cache directory to redirect extracted binaries to an attacker-chosen location, enabling arbitrary file write with victim privileges during build time.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
Dao-AILab · flash-attentionpublic PoCs found — 1
cve_referencegithub.com/Dao-AILab/flash-attention/issues/2637unverified⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.
References
https://github.com/Dao-AILab/flash-attention/commit/0816ef12f424c6ec94b057a72c275b14f6e6edb2https://github.com/Dao-AILab/flash-attention/issues/2637https://github.com/Dao-AILab/flash-attention/pull/2702https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flashattention-symlink-attack-via-tarfile-extractall-in-hopper-setup-py