RabbitMQ Java client: Unvalidated Class.forName in JSON-RPC ProcedureDescription enables arbitrary class loading
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.5epss 0.3%
exploitation probability
0.3%top 75% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.33.0, com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc.ProcedureDescription receives a javaReturnType value in an untrusted system.describe response and passes it through JSONUtil.tryFill, setJavaReturnType, and computeReturnTypeAsJavaClass to Class.forName(javaReturnType) with initialization enabled. An attacker able to answer the JsonRpcClient request through a shared broker or network interception can select a class already present in the victim JVM and trigger its static initializer, while JsonRpcClient.java later passes getReturnType output to mapper.parse and may also create type confusion. Successful exploitation can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability in the client process. This issue is fixed in version 5.33.0.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L
Affected products
rabbitmq · rabbitmq-java-clientReferences
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/0032f75f9dc3df847f94b2b85a16119250bf63cbhttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/9f8e7efd0c648f235dc0e96232ae7efa75ea4fa8https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2000https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2002https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.33.0https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-6g32-pxv4-2wfj