ethtool: cmis: validate start_cmd_payload_size from module
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.8epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 94% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: cmis: validate start_cmd_payload_size from module
The CMIS firmware update code reads start_cmd_payload_size from
the module's FW Management Features CDB reply and uses it directly
as the byte count for memcpy. The destination buffer is 112 bytes
(ETHTOOL_CMIS_CDB_LPL_MAX_PL_LENGTH - 8). So a malicious
module (or corrupted response) can cause a OOB write later on in
cmis_fw_update_start_download().
Let's error out. If modules that expect longer LPL writes actually
exist we should revisit.
struct cmis_cdb_start_fw_download_pl's definition has to move,
no change there.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
Linux · Linux