RabbitMQ: Web MQTT with PROXY Protocol enabled: a loopback-only user permission bypass
10Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 6
exploitation probability
—
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, native MQTT and MQTT over WebSocket behind a trusted PROXY Protocol frontend could lose the proxy-derived client address before the MQTT authentication path checked loopback_users, causing the frontend-to-broker address to be treated as loopback. An attacker who can reach the trusted frontend and has valid credentials for a loopback-restricted account can therefore bypass the source-address restriction; the issue does not bypass password authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
rabbitmq · rabbitmq-serverReferences
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/commit/a7528314840c4f8dc9904684f9f97ffa7aac6349https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/commit/edbead0eabbd65925d0dc914a22d6a29e155e646https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.9https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.3https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-4r6f-9cpw-f6g6