Oh My Posh: Arbitrary command execution via template injection in the path segment
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.8epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 95% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Oh My Posh is the most customisable and low-latency cross platform/shell prompt renderer. Prior to 29.35.1, the setStyle() function in src/segments/path.go passed pt.Path, which includes raw folder names, to template.Render, whose function map exposes cmd, so an attacker-controlled directory name containing a Go template expression could execute arbitrary operating system commands as the current user whenever the prompt rendered inside that directory or a descendant. This issue is fixed in version 29.35.1.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
JanDeDobbeleer · oh-my-poshReferences
https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/commit/88ddbe0b0a4dd13cc345996108c9869493f2c690https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/pull/7711https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/releases/tag/v29.35.1https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/security/advisories/GHSA-6xj8-qv9j-xcjq