Trigger.dev: Account Takeover via Cross-Provider OAuth Email Matching in Google Login
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.4epss 0.5%
exploitation probability
0.5%top 61% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. Prior to 4.5.2, addGoogleStrategy() in apps/webapp/app/services/googleAuth.server.ts passes a Google profile email to findOrCreateGoogleUser() in apps/webapp/app/models/user.server.ts without requiring Google's email_verified assertion. When existingEmailUser && !existingUser is true, the flow writes the new Google authIdentifier into the existing email-matched account and returns that user object, allowing an attacker-controlled Google profile with an unverified matching email to take over the account. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.2.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Affected products
triggerdotdev · trigger.devReferences
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-rp8c-h4xr-w9qv